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It is frequently observed that one of the great advantages of operating in uncluttered places like deserts, as opposed to cluttered urban centers, is that, whereas the former presents a logistical challenge, the dearth of civilians is an advantage. A German general captured by the British during the North Africa campaign in World War II put it this way: Desert fighting was a tacticians paradise and the quartermasters nightmare.40 This is based, however, on something of a misapprehension that in environments outside of towns and cities one is not operating among the people. Technological change is a constant that touches upon every aspect of urban warfare. Weapons are more powerful as time passes and communications are more rapid and dense. Overall, there has been an acceleration of the transnational flow of people, ideas, and things across the global political economy that seems, at first glance, to be a major complicating factor in politics and warfare. There has also been a change of scale: Cities are simply bigger by an order of magnitude than they were in the past because there are vastly more people in the world and fewer of them are needed to work in agriculture. At the end of the day, however, these are changes in form rather than substance. The challenges faced by the British Army in Basra in 2005 were not all that different from those that it faced in Buenos Aires 200 years earlier. 1. The University of Maryland is propelled by fearless ideas. Our fearlessness generates creativity, innovation, and an entrepreneurial spirit with which few can compete. What ignites your spark and makes you fearless? Over the past four decades, scholars have repeatedly implored historians of U.S. foreign relations to adopt a broad perspective that places American policymaking in an international or comparative Doing so, historians like Sally Marks argued in the 1980s, would force diplomatic historians to recognize that the most important sources for U.S. foreign policy were frequently foreign in origin. As Marks put it, Although the American government can and does undertake major policy initiatives, it is often reacting to situations or policies elsewhere.13 By developing the requisite linguistic skills that would enable them to use foreign archival sources, diplomatic historians could, according to critics like Marks, combat the ethnocentrism and exceptionalism that limited their scholarship.
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Essay activities university park md - 11 The cases considered were: Jerusalem 70, Rome 410, Constantinople 1453, Londonderry 1689, Gibraltar 177983, Acre 1799, Sevastopol 1854, Lucknow 1857, Paris 187071, Plevna 1877, Mafeking 18991900, and Port Arthur 190405.
Ulysses S. Grant's Overland Campaign: A Portrait in Command
Should I Apply to University of Maryland? - Overall, we accept that the reality of demographics and geopolitics means that warfare will increasingly occur in urban environments. Nevertheless, we argue this is not, in itself, a development to be feared. If this represents a change, then it is one of degree not of fundamentals and is manageable with the right mindset one that is sensitive to both opportunities and threats and with bold and creative leadership.
Until the Cold Wars end, however, internationalists in this Marksian sense remained a minority within the subfield of diplomatic history the majority of historians were reticent about taking an international turn. Walter LaFeber gave voice to many in the field when he argued in 1981 that, given the reality of U. S. dominance after World War I, it would be misleading if all parts of the [international] system are considered to be roughly equal, or if the influence of that system on the United States is assumed to be as great as the American influence on the system. 14 The majority of LaFebers colleagues shared this perspective, and, in fact, doubted whether one could write sophisticated international history involving several As Richard H. Immerman remarked in 1990, international history 3 For the ways in which the term international history has been used, see, Paul A. Kramer, Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World, American Historical Review 115, no. 5 (December 2011): 138385, 51 A point that Jim Storr argues holds true for the Allied armies in general in World War II. See, The Hall of Mirrors: War and Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Warwick, UK: Helion and Co. , 2018), 155.
The evidence surrounding the symbolic importance of cities and its hold on the minds of politicians is also quite mixed. One of the major problems with using Stalingrad as a benchmark is that it was extremely unusual in the strength of its political symbolism. For Stalin and Hitler, both unbridled totalitarian autocrats, the battle was a proxy for a personal and ideological contest a test not only of each others will but of the total national strength they could command. Thus, neither could contemplate retreat or surrender, causing both men to hurl division after division into the cauldron of fire. This has not been the case, however, in more recent urban battles. Prior to the turn of the new millennium, the University of Maryland welcomed 75 of the applicant pool into the Terrapin family. In recent years, the UMD acceptance rate has been as low as 44 and the number of applicants has more than doubled since the end of the Clinton Presidency. A generation ago, many Maryland freshmen possessed solid-but-unspectacular academic credentials; in 2021, first-year Terrapins sport a median SAT score of 1375 and an average weighted GPA of over 4.3. Yesits really THAT competitive. 69 Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: Americas Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010); and Andrew J. Bacevich, Ending Endless War: A Pragmatic Military Strategy, Foreign Affairs 95, no. 5 (September/October 2016), Mary L. Dudziaks War-Time is an exception that proves the rule. See, Mary L. Dudziak, War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). For an earlier take on a similar subject, see, Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). To a degree difficult to fully recapture today, World War II witnessed the emergence of the United States to a position of predominant power in global, and especially Asian, affairs. Even before the defeat of the Japanese Empire in the summer of 1945, all sides in the incipient struggle for Indochina grasped just how important the American role was likely to be in the postwar world. What will the Americans do? was the question that resonated in the halls of power in Paris, London, Hanoi, Saigon, Chongqing, and Moscow. Small wonder that on Aug. 30, 1945 before Japan officially surrendered Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to President Harry S. Truman asking for the Viet Minh to be involved in any Allied discussion regarding Vietnams postwar status. (Truman, similar to Woodrow Wilson before him, ignored Ho.) The Vietnamese leader was right to worry about U.S. policy. As described above, American resources soon enabled the French to maintain their tenuous and bloody hold on the country for almost a decade, before the Americans themselves assumed responsibility for the newly created Republic of Vietnam. As Hos appeal to Truman reveals, long before Frances defeat at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, North Vietnamese leaders recognized an emergent United States, not an enfeebled France, as their principal foe, and adjusted their strategy